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ADOPTED CHILDREN OTHER THAN TESTATOR'S
PRESUMED TO TAKE AS "CHILDREN" UNDER
HIS WILL, REGARDLESS OF TIME OF ADOPTION
The original Pennsylvania adoption act of 1855, and all sub-
sequent adoption statutes' have provided that an adopted child
shall have all of the rights of a child and heir of his adoptive par-
ents. In In re Estate of TafelJ2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has belatedly taken a major step to enforce that legislative man-
date. The decision provides a new judicial presumption to be used
in the construction of wills. Prior to Tafel, Pennsylvania courts
had presumed that, absent any contrary intention in the will, the
testator meant to exclude children adopted after his death from a
gift or bequest to a "child" or "children" other than his own. That
presumption has been overruled by Tafel and a testator will now
be presumed to have intended to include children adopted at any
time in a gift or bequest to those classes.
In February, 1935, Adolph Tafel executed a will in which he
provided for a testamentary trust, to pay income from the corpus
to his wife for as long as she should live. Upon her death, the
corpus was to be divided into four equal shares, one for each of his
children. Each child was to receive income from his share until
his death, after which the corpus was to "go to such of his or her
other children as may then be living and to the issue then living
of such of them as may be dead." Failing such children (the testa-
tor's grandchildren) or the issue of such children, gifts over were
provided. The testator died in July, 1935, and his widow died in
1945. His only son died in 1970, survived by two children (the ap-
pellants), who had been adopted six and nine years after the testa-
tor's death.
The Orphans' Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia barred appellants from taking under Adolph Tafel's
1. Act of May 4, 1855, No. 456, § 7 [1855] Pa. Laws 430 (repealed
1925); Act of May 19, 1887, No. 66 [1887) Pa. Laws 125 (repealed 1925);
Act of May 9, 1889, No. 187 [1889] Pa. Laws 168 (repealed 1925); Act of
June 1, 1911 [1911] Pa. Laws 539 (repealed 1925); Act of April 4,
1925, No. 93, § 1 [1925] Pa. Laws 127 (repealed 1970); Act of June 30,
1947, No. 491, § 1 [1947] Pa. Laws 1180 (repealed 1970); Act of August 26,
1953, No. 400, § 1 [1953] Pa. Laws 1411 (repealed 1970); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 502 (Supp. 1972).
2. 449 Pa. 442, 296 A.2d 797 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tafel].
will, relying on section 16(b) of the 1917 Wills Act 8 and Holton
Estate.4 The trial court applied the accepted presumption, that the
testator wished to exclude children adopted after his will was ex-
ecuted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Orphans'
Court, holding that, in the absence of a manifested contrary in-
tent, it will be presumed that the testator intended to include chil-
dren, adopted at any time, in a bequest or devise to a "child" or
"children."
Adoption was not recognized at common law; consequently the
original state adoption statutes5 provided original definitions of the
rights and relationships which they created. The significance of
Pennsylvania's first adoption act is noted by the court in Tafel:
'This Act of 1855 has a four-fold significance: its dec-
laration that an adopted child was the 'heir' of its adopting
parents, its recognition of the existence of reciprocal rights
of inheritance between an adopted child and its adoptive
brothers and sisters, its omission to grant reciprocal rights
of inheritance to the adopting parents and its recognition
that estates of intestates might descend to and be distrib-
uted among persons not of the blood of the intestate.'
6
The statute received very strict interpretation by the courts, espe-
cially in their treatment of adopted children as heirs of their adop-
tive parents,7 and greater equality of inheritance rights between
natural and adopted children has taken more than a century of
slow and difficult progress.
Shortly after the passage of the 1855 Act, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that, "giving an adopted son a right to inherit
does not make him a son in fact."" As a result of this construction
of the Act, Pennsylvania courts did not treat adopted children as
heirs of their adoptive parents in all instances. Thus, a child
adopted after his adoptive parent had made a will, unlike after-
born natural children, could not take his intestate share against
that will if it failed to provide for him.9 In addition, adopted chil-
dren were not permitted to inherit from collateral kindred of their
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, App. Ch. 2, § 228 (1950):
Whenever in any will a bequest or devise shall be made to the
child or children of any person other than the testator, without
naming such child or children, such bequest or devise shall be
construed to include any adopted child or children of such other
person who were adopted before the date of the will, unless a con-
trary intention shall appear by the will.
4. 399 Pa. 241, 159 A.2d 883 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Holton].
5. The first general adoption statute was passed by Massachusetts
in 1851. Most states followed suit within the next quarter century. Presser,
The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM.
L. 443, 456 (1971).
6. 449 Pa. 442, 447, 296 A.2d 797, 800 (1972) (quoting Collins Estate,
393 Pa. 195, 201, 142 A.2d 178, 182 (1958)).
7. See text accompanying notes 8-14 infra.
8. Commonwealth v. Nancrede, 32 Pa. 389, 390 (1859).
9. Goldstein v. Hammell, 236 Pa. 305, 84 A. 772 (1912).
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adoptive parents. 10 More importantly, adopted children were de-
nied the right of taking as "children" of their adoptive parents un-
der any third person's will." In Puterbaugh's Estate, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court stated its rationale for the distinction be-
tween the rights of adopted and natural children in construing a
testator's intent:
[I] t is quite . . . fair and proper to assume that he (the
testator) knew . . . of the clear distinction the law makes
between natural and adopted children; for instance that
the giving the latter the right to inherit does not make him
a child in fact .... 12
The most common result of this line of cases was that, as in Tafel,
adopted children were prevented from taking under a will of rela-
tives of their adoptive parents who had predeceased their adop-
tion.13 The courts' determination to enforce the distinction be-
tween adopted and natural children is illustrated, however, by the
fact that the testator's knowledge of an adopted child gave that
child no greater right to take as the "child" of his adoptive parents.
In Yate's Estate14 it was held that, even though the child had been
adopted long before the date of the will, the testator knew and re-
ferred to the child as the child of its adoptive mother and, at his
death, the mother had had no natural children and was at an age
at which that would be extremely unlikely, the adopted child
could not take as a "child."
The Wills Act of 191715 partially remedied the inequitable treat-
ment of adopted children under the law. Section 16(b) of that act
stated that children, other than those of the testator, who had
been adopted before the execution of his will would be included in
a bequest or gift to a "child" or "children" made by that will. Al-
though the statute addressed itself solely to inclusion of children
adopted before the will's execution, it, like the 1855 Act, received
consistently strict interpretation:
[A] n examination of this statute clearly reveals the legisla-
tive intent; to include within the term 'child' or 'children'
of a person other than the testator an adopted 'child' or
'children' provided, however, that such adoption took place
10. Burnett's Estate, 219 Pa. 599, 69 A. 74 (1908).
11. Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867); Freeman's Estate (No. 1), 40
Pa. Super. 31 (1909).
12. 261 Pa. 235, 238-9, 104 A. 601 (1918).
13. See Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867).
14. 281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, App. Ch. 2, § 228 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as section 16(b), or in its entirety, the Wills Act of 19171. See note 3 for
the text of § 16 (b).
before the execution of the will and to exclude such
adopted child or children if the adoption took place after
the execution of the will.10
The 1917 Wills Act, therefore, had the effect of declaring that
adopted children were "children in fact," but only if they were
adopted before the testator made his will.
In the century following the statutory recognition of adoption
in 1855, the inheritance rights of adopted children were broadened
by the legislature in a few limited areas. The Intestate Act of 1917
granted the right to inherit from the collateral kindred of adoptive
parents. 17 A 1921 amendment to the 1917 Wills Act provided that
a child adopted after the adoptive parent had made a will and not
included therein, could take his intestate share in the parent's es-
tate.' s Finally, the Wills Act of 194719 extended the cut-off date
created by the 1917 statute by providing that children of other per-
sons adopted before the testator's death could take under his will
as a "child" or "children." Both the 1956 Act 20 which amended
the 1947 Wills Act and the newly enacted "Probate, Estate and Fi-
duciary Code" 21 perpetuate the language of the 1947 Act.
Thus, an adopted child's right of inheritance from his parents,
regardless of the time of adoption, plus the right to stand in the
adoptive parent's place and inherit from his collateral kindred were
gradually secured. However, the strict interpretation of section
16(b) 22 remained. Adopted children could not take as "children,"
"descendants" or "issue" of their adoptive parents under the will
of someone who had executed the will (or had died) 23 before their
adoption and had designated one of those classes for a gift or be-
quest. The perpetuation of this presumption made this the only
16. Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 247, 159 A.2d 883, 886 (1960). See
Chambers Estate, 438 Pa. 22, 263 A.2d 746 (1970); Collins Estate, 393 Pa.
195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958); Corr's Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A.2d 76 (1940).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, App. Ch. 1, § 102 (1950). For an interpre-
tative discussion of this statute, see Cave's Estate, 326 Pa. 358, 362, 192 A.
460, 463 (1937).
18. 20 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, App. Ch. 2, § 273 (1950).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(6) (1950).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(6) (Supp. 1972).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2514(7) (eff. July 1, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as the Probate, Estate & Fiduciary Code].
22. A traditional interpretative rule in Pennsylvania is that, in the
interpretation of words used to express the testator's intent which have a
legal or technical meaning, the law in effect at the testator's death must
govern that interpretation. Collins Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 200, 142 A.2d 178,
181 (1958). In fact, the 1947 Wills Act specifically provides that all wills
of persons who died before its effective date shall be construed in light
of prior law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.22 (1950). Because of this, sec-
tion 16(b) of the 1917 Wills Act has been, by far, the most predominantly
interpreted statute in this area. Most wills involved are those of grand-
parents who made bequests or gifts to grandchildren as a class, their
rights to vest upon the death of the testator's children. Consequently, the
majority of the wills involved were probated before 1947.
23. Depending upon which wills act governed the interpretation of
the will. See note 22 supra.
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remaining distinction in the law between the inheritance rights of
adopted and natural children. The court finally addressed itself
to its unfairness and it became the victim of slow, but steady judi-
cial attack, of which Tafel is the latest and most important example.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court challenged the old presump-
tion favoring natural over adopted children in two ways: first, by
finding that the testator specifically intended to include adopted
children in those classes of persons who would take under his will
and, second, by changing the legal definition of the terms that
were being interpreted. The first method, finding an intention
contrary to the legal presumption, had little success. In Holton,
24
the testator set up a testamentary trust which provided in part for
any children of his son. Two children were adopted by the son
after the testator's death and the court refused to allow them to
take under the will, basing its decision upon section 16(b). The
majority asserted that if an intent to include after-adopted chil-
dren can be found in the will, any statutory rule of interpretation
such as section 16(b) is abandoned and the testator's intent is de-
terminative. The majority could find no such intent, however, and
refused the adopted children's claim.
25
In dissent,20 Mr. Justice Musmanno found that the testator
was aware that his son could have no natural children and that he
had used language in his will showing an intention to include any
children his son might adopt within his bequest. Upon finding the
intent to include adopted children, the dissent did not then abandon
section 16(b) as the majority would have; rather Mr. Justice Mus-
manno contended that section 16(b) itself allowed the testator's
intent to prevail because of its modifying phrase, "unless a contrary
intention shall appear by the will."
'27
The dissent's reliance upon an interpretation of the last modi-
fying phrase of section 16(b) as a basis for a rule of construction
is significant because the court in Tafel also bases its new presump-
tion on an interpretation of the same phrase. 2 Because section
16(b) only expressly creates a presumption that adopted children
shall be included before the will's execution, the phrase, "unless
a contrary intention shall appear by the will" would appear to
modify only that express presumption. However, until Tafel, sec-
24. 399 Pa. 241, 159 A.2d 883 (1960).
25. Id. at 246, 159 A.2d at 885 (1960).
26. Id. at 249, 159 A.2d at 887 (dissenting opinion).
27. See note 3 for the entire text of § 16 (b).
28. 449 Pa. 442, 449, 296 A.2d 797, 800 (1972).
tion 16(b) had consistently been interpreted as not only expressly
including children adopted before the will, but also by implication
excluding children adopted after the will's execution from a gift
or bequest to "children. '29 In line with this interpretation of sec-
tion 16(b), Mr. Justice Musmanno read the phrase "unless a con-
trary intention shall appear by the will" as also modifying the im-
plied exclusion of children adopted after the will's execution.
Therefore, he reasoned, if the will showed that the testator's inten-
tion were to include children adopted after his will was made, sec-
tion 16 (b) permitted this.
In Chamber's Estate30 the court illustrated the majority posi-
tion in Holton, i.e. if an intent to include after-adopted children
can be found, a statutory rule of interpretation, such as section
16(b), cannot be used and the testator's intent controls. In Cham-
bers, the court stated that a testator's intent can be ascertained
from four factors: the language of the will, the scheme of distri-
bution, the factual situation at the date of the will's execution, and
the existing fact situation at the time of the court's decision. 31
The court found such an intent, based upon the testator's knowl-
edge of one adopted grandson (who predeceased him) and other
circumstances, such as knowledge that his daughter could have no
natural children. Mr. Chief Justice Bell vigorously dissented, ar-
ing that any intent contrary to the rule of section 16(b) must be
found within the four corners of the will.A2 The dissent's position
was that the testator's knowledge of both a previous adoption and
the daughter's inability to have natural children was not an ade-
quate manifestation of an intention to include adopted children in
the bequest to "children" under the will.
The dissenting opinion in Holton and the majority in Cham-
bers represent a limited attempt by the court to circumvent the
rule of construction embodied in section 16(b) by finding an inten-
tion on the part of the testator to include after-adopted children
in his gifts or bequests to "children." The attempt was not suc-
cessful because of disagreement within the court on how such an
intent could be found, and its effectiveness as a general rule was
limited by its necessary reliance upon the facts of each case.
A second, more direct method of challenging the old rule of
section 16(b) was to change the legal meaning of the words em-
ployed in the will. The technical basis for differentiating between
natural and adopted children had always been an interpretation of
29. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
30. 438 Pa. 22, 263 A.2d 746 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Chambers].
31. Id. at 25, 263 A.2d at 748 (1970).
32. Id. at 28, 263 A.2d at 749 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Chief Justice
Bell's interpretation of § .16(b) here is consistent with Mr. Justice Mus-




the words "children," "issue" or "descendants." An early case
stated that "One adopted has the fights of a child without being a
child."33  As late as 1963, the court referred to the words, "chil-
dren," "grandchildren," "issue" and "lineal descendants" as "words
of blood. 314 This was an interpretation of a will executed in 1889,
and was probably correct for the time of execution. However, in
construing more modem wills, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
is gradually deleting any connotation of blood line from these
terms.
A major decision in the development of a more contemporary
interpretation of these words was Collins Estate,3 5 which held that
children adopted after the death of the testatrix could take under
her will as "descendants." Mr. Justice Jones, speaking for the
court, stated that:
Neither etymologically "nor historically has the word 'de-
scendants' acquired such significance that it points unerr-
ingly in this will-in the face of the legally accepted equa-
tion of status of an adopted child and a natural child-to
an intent to exclude from a testatrix's bounty children le-
gally adopted by her children.36
The court discussed the meaning of "issue" and decided that, al-
though that classification does strongly connote a blood relation-
ship, "issue" and "descendants" are not always or strictly synony-
mous.37 Therefore, since "descendants" does not connote only nat-
ural children, the court provided a modern and definitive interpre-
tation of the word's use in wills. As a result of Collins, adopted
children, regardless of the time of their adoption, can take as "de-
scendants" of their adoptive parents.
An harbinger of the Tafel decision came in Mr. Justice Rob-
erts' dissenting opinion in Fownes Trust.38 In interpreting the
term "issue" as used in a testamentary trust the majority held that
its meaning was limited to issue of the body, i.e. natural children.
The dissent found that construction antiquated, stating:
[G]iven two equally plausible views, I see no justification
for discarding one which fosters the sound public policy of
this Commonwealth to accord equality of treatment to
adopted children in favor of one which perpetuates distinc-
33. Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304, 306 (1867) (emphasis added).
34. Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389, 393, 189 A.2d 870, 873 (1963).
35. 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Collins].
36. Id. at 211, 142 A.2d at 186.
37. Id. at 209, 142 A.2d at 185.
38. 421 Pa. 476, 481, 220 A.2d 8, 11 (1966) (dissenting opinion in
which Justices Musmanno and Jones joined).
tions which no longer exist in the eyes of adoptive parents
or enlightened modern people everywhere. Thus, the
sound approach, as I view the matter, would be to adopt a
rule of construction which, in the absence of a clear expres-
sion in the instrument of the settlor's intention to the con-
trary, would deem adoptees as embraced within such gen-
eral designations as "issue" or "children."' 9
Justices Musmanno and Jones joined the dissent and the possibility
of the transformation of the minority to a majority veiw became
significantly stronger.
Tafel has accomplished half of the necessary transformation by
reversing the old rule that, absent any manifestation of intent to
the contrary, a testator is presumed to have intended that children
adopted after the execution of his will were not included in a gift
or bequest to a "child" or "children" of another person. The court
substitutes 'a new presumption that, in the absence of any ex-
pressed intent to the contrary, minor children adopted after the
execution of the will were intended to be included.40 The old rule,
as enunciated in Holton Estate,41 is specifically overruled.42  The
presumption only applies when there is no expressed intent on the
matter by the testator. The court has not limited the right to dis-
tinguish between adopted and natural children in a will, if a testa-
tor wishes to do so.4" The new rule is limited in one respect-it
does not apply where the adoptee was an adult at the time of adop-
tion. This restriction is imposed to guard against adoptions under-
taken "to prevent a gift over in default of a natural 'child' or 'chil-
dren' and thus, in effect, rewrite the testator's will."
'4 4
The court, in Tafel, finds two bases of support for its decision:
the first on grounds of legislative policy and the second founded
upon modern conceptions of adoption. The expressed legislative
policy of Pennsylvania has always been one of equal rights and
privileges for both adopted and natural children. In regard to
rights of inheritance, the policy has been specifically enunciated by
the legislature in all of the adoption acts.4 5 By effectuating that
policy, Tafel must be viewed as an important step in observance of
a legislative mandate that has been largely ignored in prior Penn-
sylvania case law.4 6 The second basic rationale for the decision is
that, in light of modern attitudes toward adopted children and their
total acceptance into the family structure, the Tafel court feels that
it is much more sensible and reasonable to believe that a testator
meant to include, rather than exclude them as "children" in his
39. Id. at 484, 220 A.2d at 12.
40. 449 Pa. 442, 449, 296 A.2d 797, 800 (1972).
41. 399 Pa. 241, 159 A.2d 883 (1960).
42. 449 Pa. 442, 449, 296 A.2d 797, 800 (1972).
43. Id. at 452-4, 296 A.2d at 802-3.
44. Id. at 454, 296 A.2d at 803.
45. Id. at 447, 296 A.2d at 799 n.5.
46. Id. at 447, 296 A.2d at 800 n.6.
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will. Adoption statutes did not create the social phenomenon of
adoption, they merely recognized and regulated it.47 Common at-
titudes toward adoption should therefore be given effect in the ju-
dicial construction of language dealing with the subject.48 The dis-
sent in Fownes Trust49 is extensively quoted for the proposition
that when there is no real expression of intent by the testator,
modern attitudes dictate a presumption that adopted children are
encompassed wthin the designation "children," especially in light
of Pennsylvania's public policy of equality of adopted and natural
children. 0 The court's reasoning in Tafel is sound here, as well.
If a court is forced to rely upon a legal presumption, it is only log-
ical that it embody prevailing attitudes and meanings. To hold
otherwise would be to destroy the effectiveness and rationale of the
presumption in the first place.
Because the court was bound to apply the 1917 Wills Act,51 the
presumption of exclusion of after-adopted children that is reversed
by Tafel was derived from section 16(b). The court states that its
new presumption is also founded upon a construction of section
16(b), specifically, the phrase, "unless a contrary intention ap-
pears."5 2 It is difficult to understand how a construction of this
modifying phrase can lead to the formulation of the new judicial
presumption. It is submitted that reference to the phrase is an un-
necessary technicality, because of the court's specific policy basis
and its interpretation of the modern meaning of "child" and "chil-
dren." The same result could have been reached by simply over-
ruling the prior interpretation of section 16(b).3 (which the court
did) without introducing a confusing construction of any particular
phrase. The fact that the court was forced to rely upon an inter-
pretation of the 1917 Wills Act will not affect the application of the
new rule, for it is in harmony with the other wills acts and the
court specifically states5 4 that it does not conflict with the new Pro-
bate, Estate, and Fiduciary Code. These statutes themselves rep-
resent legislative liberalization of the old rule, and are now subject
to the rule enunciated in Tafel.
With the Tafel decision, the right of adopted children to take
47. As suport for this the court quotes from In re Coe, 42 N.J. 485,
489, 201 A.2d 571, 574 (1964).
48. 449 Pa. 442, 450, 296 A.2d 797, 801 (1972).
49. 421 Pa. 476, 481, 220 A.2d 8, 11 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
50. 449 Pa. 442, 451, 296 A.2d 797, 802 (1972).
51. See note 22 supra.
52. 449 Pa. 442, 449, 296 A.2d 797, 800 (1972).
53. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
54. 449 Pa. 442, 453, 296 A.2d 797, 803 (.1972).
as "descendants" and "children" of their adoptive parents, under
anyone's will is now conclusively established. The decision is jus-
tified, both as a correct reading of the modem usage of the word
"children" and as an expression of legislative policy. The danger
of adoptions made only to frustrate the operation of a will should
be effectively prevented by the exclusion of adult adoptions from
the operation of the rule. The court notes that, while this pre-
sumption may not yet be the law in a majority of jurisdictions,
many other jurisdictions have adopted it.55 Hopefully, those
which have not yet changed their rule will follow suit when the
opportunity presents itself. The only important designation that
remains tied to its older meaning is "issue." It is still the law in
Pennsylvania that only natural children can take under this classi-
fication. 50 While it may be true that "issue" has had a stronger
connotation of blood line than either "children" or "descendants,"
it is probably also true that today that connotation has largely
vanished. In light of both the dissent in Fownes Trust5T and Tafel,
a re-litigation before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of the ques-
tion of whether adopted children qualify as "issue" would be es-
pecially timely.
GREGORY R. YOUNG
55. Id. at 449, 296 A.2d at 801, notes 8-9.
56. Benedum Estate, 427 Pa. 408, 235 A.2d 129 (1967); Howlett Estate,
366 Pa. 293, 77 A.2d 390 (1951).
57. 421 Pa. 476, 481, 220 A.2d 8, 11 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
